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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING LAW THROUGH CONTRACTS AND CARDOZO*

CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER**
Contracts might be regarded as the most durable of first-year law school
subjects. After all, it was through contracts that Christopher Langdell
introduced the case method.1 More than a century later, contracts remains a
required course not only at Harvard, where Langdell taught, but at virtually
every other American law school. Yet, contracts might also be regarded as the
least durable of first-year subjects. Nearly three decades ago Grant Gilmore
examined contracts and, in a brilliant essay, pronounced it dead.2 It is not clear
how Gilmore’s claim should be interpreted or whether it is true. But this much
seems undeniable: many of the subjects that were once encompassed within the
common law of contracts have been hived off into separate domains, often
governed by statute and treated in specialized law school courses. Some of the
classic common law cases that still populate contracts casebooks would today
be regarded as falling under the rubric of sales, employment law, insurance
law, consumer protection law, family law, real estate law, and so on.
If prone to dramatics, one might say that the guiding ambition of classical
contract law—namely, to produce a unified doctrine applicable to all
agreements and promises, regardless of either their subject matter or the
identity of their makers—is a manifest failure. Why should every American
law student be required to take a long course on a failed doctrine? I have two
answers to that question (I don’t mean to suggest that every contracts teacher
should answer the same way). First, the issues addressed by the common law
of contacts endure even when the common law’s resolution of those issues
does not. For example, in any area (sales, employment, real estate, and so on)
* © 2000 Christopher L. Eisgruber. All rights reserved.
** Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I am grateful to Rudy Delson, Lewis
Kornhauser and Liam Murphy for comments on previous drafts of this essay, and to Harvey Dale,
Bill Nelson and Larry Sager for helpful conversations about its topic. I would also like to thank
the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at the New York
University School of Law, which provided generous support for this project. Finally, I would like
to thank my students at NYU, who for the last ten years have taught me much and made
Contracts a delight to teach. To them I dedicate this essay.
1. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 12-14 (1974). As Gilmore’s showed, it is
arguable that Langdell not only invented the case method through contracts, but invented
contracts through the case method. Id.
2. Id.
1511
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where parties may bind themselves by mutual agreement, issues will arise if
one party makes an offer, and the other responds affirmatively but varies the
terms. Have the parties “agreed” on something sufficient to produce legally
binding obligations? Or does the variation in terms mean that the parties have
no agreement at all? The common law, of course, treated these issues through
the rather inflexible “mirror-image rule,” pursuant to which a putative
“acceptance” that varied the terms of an offer was not an acceptance at all, but
a counter-offer and a rejection of the original offer. I do not know whether that
ancient rule would provide sound guidance to a lawyer today facing an issue
about whether, say, in the state of New Jersey minor discrepancies between
offer and acceptance will vitiate an apparent contract for the sale of real estate.
But that’s not the point. Having encountered the old common law cases, a
competent lawyer will hit the books (or boot up the computer) to find out
whether in New Jersey there are special rules applicable to real estate
contracts, whether or not the “mirror-image rule” is strictly observed, and so
on. Once a lawyer recognizes that an issue exists, the process of identifying
relevant statutes and rules is, if not always easy, nonetheless pedestrian. The
trick is to see the issue in the first place.
The second objective for my contracts course is deeper and more
interesting—or it’s more interesting to me, at any rate. As part of the first-year
curriculum, contracts introduces not only the particular issues that surround the
making and enforcement of private agreements, but also more general
questions about the nature of law. It participates, along with other first-year
courses, in the famous and mysterious task of teaching students to “think like
lawyers.” That project has many facets, but one important component is to
teach students what sorts of claims will and won’t fly as legal arguments.
More precisely, students must acquire a feel for what arguments might be
persuasive to judges, or more precisely still, for what arguments other lawyers
might regard as plausibly persuasive to judges, since legal arguments will carry
weight to the extent that somebody (even if wrongly) believes that those
arguments have a chance to convince some judge (or another authoritative
legal decision-maker) to do something. And how are students supposed to
anticipate what judges might find persuasive? They have to put themselves in
the judge’s shoes; less metaphorically, they have to imagine themselves as
judges. To “think like lawyers,” students must first try to “think like judges.”
Students don’t always feel comfortable imagining themselves as judges.
To be sure, some of them may hope eventually to be judges; they may even
harbor a secret ambition to be Supreme Court justices. When they study the
law, though, they often do so from the standpoint of “rule-followers” or
“instruction-takers.” They imagine themselves not as judges but as first-year
associates or even as soon-to-be-takers-of-the-bar-exam. They assume that
judges, by experience and training, “know the law.” The students accordingly
suppose that they cannot hope to “think like judges” until after they learn the
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law. And, of course, to some extent the students are correct; there are indeed
things that judges know which students don’t. For example, judges (unlike
students) know that there is a doctrine which travels under the name “the parol
evidence rule” and which has something to say about the circumstances under
which written contracts will trump or exclude other agreements. But, in
general, it gets things backward to suppose that one must first “know the law”
in order to learn to “think like a judge.” Students can easily be informed about
the existence of rules and doctrines. The hard part, for judges as well as for
students, is figuring out what it means to know the rule or doctrine—figuring
out, in other words, how the doctrine might be applied, when exceptions might
be created, and so on. To do that, one must take some position about how
judges do and should use the discretion granted them within the American
political system. Judges’ approaches to that problem will undoubtedly be
influenced by their experience, and some of that experience will undoubtedly
come from aspects of legal practice which are familiar to most judges but
foreign to virtually all students. Nevertheless, a large of part of legal education
in general, and first-year legal education in particular, involves equipping
students with insights and theories through which they can comprehend the
goals, concerns and impulses which shape judicial creativity.
Therein lies one often overlooked purpose behind the case method.
Students must, of course, learn how to separate “holding” from “dictum,” since
they will need that skill in practice. Still, if the point of assigning cases were
to communicate their “holdings,” the case method would be crushingly
inefficient. Why have students scour multiple pages, highlighters poised-andready, looking for the crucial passage, when we could assign books and articles
that state the point more baldly? The case method, however, accomplishes
more. A great aid in getting students to “think like judges” is the fact that
judges write opinions which purport to explain their decision-making process.
Properly applied, the case method capitalizes on this opportunity. By careful
dissection of judicial opinions, students begin to appreciate the variety of ways
in which the judicial mind works. They learn what sorts of creativity the legal
community expects and accepts from judges, since the reasons which judges
offer in opinions are submitted to that community with the hope that the
arguments will be deemed legitimate. And students are also provoked to
speculate, when judges write opinions that seem disingenuous, about why
judges wrote in the way they did—about, in other words, what might really be
going on “behind the scenes.” Students thereby (whether they realize it or not)
use judicial opinions as windows upon judicial creativity, and hence as guides
to possibilities for creative legal argument in general.
Learning to “think like judges” means, among other things, coming to
appreciate the variety of objectives that judges might have when they decide a
case. Judges might try to produce a just result in the particular controversy
before them. They may try to set a precedent that produces good results in the
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future. And, of course, there are a variety of criteria that might be used to
assess what counts as “good results.” We might hope that the legal system
would resolve controversies in ways that are substantively desirable, consistent
with democratic principles, predictable, and reasonably cheap. In practice, of
course, people will disagree both about what these goals mean (which results
are “substantively desirable?”) and about what to do when the goals come into
conflict or tension with one another, as they inevitably do.
Regardless of their objectives, judges also face a more technical set of
concerns. They must decide among means as well as ends; they must, in other
words, select which legal or judicial “techniques” to employ in pursuit of their
objectives.3 If, for example, a judge wants to bring about a particular result in
the case before her, she will often be able to do so either through a factual
determination or through a legal ruling. Which route she chooses will, of
course, have an impact both upon possibilities for appeal (unless the judge sits
on a court of last resort) and upon how her decision will affect future cases. A
judge who wishes to influence subsequent cases will want to emphasize legal,
rather than factual, issues. She will have to choose among multiple ways of
framing her disposition. She can propose a flexible standard, which openly
invites the exercise of discretion by later judges (e.g., “a promisee’s reliance
will not render a promise enforceable unless the reliance was reasonable and
injustice would result if the promise were not enforced”). Or she can attempt
to articulate a mechanical test, which seeks to limit the discretion of her
successors (e.g., “reliance, no matter how reasonable, will never render a
promise binding in the absence of bargained-for consideration”). Regardless
of whether her proposed rule is flexible or mechanical, the judge may define its
domain broadly or narrowly: she may announce a rule that purports to govern
all contracts of any kind, or she may announce a rule limited to sales contracts
between merchants.
These questions of legal technique are crucial to the process of “thinking
like a judge,” and they are uncharted territory for most non-lawyers, including
new students freshly arrived at law school. Acquainting students with these
problems, and providing them with a set of theoretical tools by which to
analyze the problems, is one crucial component of a first-year legal education.
For that purpose, contracts is splendid. To begin with, the substantive policy
interests at stake in contract law are relatively muted. Contract law provides
parties with an opportunity to establish what legally binding norms will govern
their relationship—the parties can, in a sense, make law for themselves.
Contract litigation usually arises because, in one way or another, parties failed
to take advantage of that opportunity: either the parties arguably never entered
3. I borrow the concept of “judicial techniques” from P.S. Atiyah’s excellent essay,
Judicial Techniques and the Law of Contract, in P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 244-74
(1986), which I assign during the second semester of my contracts course.
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into a contract at all, or they entered into a contract but did not address some
issue which later became the focal point of a dispute. In a setting where (by
hypothesis) the parties were free to allocate some risk in whatever way they
chose, and where (again by hypothesis) neither party insisted on a clear
allocation of that risk, it will be rare that justice or economic policy will
generate strong reasons to allocate the risk one way or the other. No doubt
some of the contributors to this symposium will disagree, but I find that the
equities in contracts cases are rarely poignant enough to set my blood boiling,
save for those exceptional instances where there is a strong smell of deceit or
where the court proposes (rightly or, more often, wrongly) to ignore the
parties’ intentions.4 Perhaps it is simply the “whiff of fraud” (or, if not fraud,
then some other sort of malfeasance) that makes these cases provocative, rather
than the courts’ decision to frame the cases in terms of whether or not the
parties’ intentions should be honored. The latter choice is itself a matter of
judicial technique; it’s always possible, and often easy, to recharacterize the
cases in other ways. So, for example, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining
Co. can be recharacterized as a “mistake” or an “implied term” case, in which
the issue is how to deal with a risk (namely, that the re-grading project would
be very expensive) not specifically addressed in the contract, and Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. can be recharacterized as an “offer-andacceptance” case about whether Mrs. Williams consented to the fine print in an
adhesion contract. In the vast run of cases, though, the point of contract law
will be to produce a predictable pattern of decisions (thereby reducing the cost
of adjudication, and providing guidance for parties who care to seek it5) and to
4. Controversial cases in which courts allowed public policy to trump an agreement
between the parties include Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla.
1962) (refusing to enforce mining company’s obligation to re-grade land; according to the court,
the obligation would have involved gross “economic waste”); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204
(Ill. 1979) (refusing to enforce a contract between a cohabiting couple on the ground that to do so
would undermine the institution of marriage); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (refusing to enforce the “add-on” clause of an installment purchase
contract on the ground that the clause was unconscionable). Interestingly, one might find a
“whiff of fraud” in all three of these cases; one might suspect that the mining company never
intended to regrade the land in Peevyhouse, that the “husband” in Hewitt tricked his “wife” into
believing that a formal marriage was unnecessary, and that Walker-Thomas never explained its
“add-on” clause to Mrs. Williams. What’s more, in two of the three cases—Peevyhouse and
Hewitt—the “tortfeasor” (if there was one) actually benefited from the court’s departure from
ordinary contract principles!
5. Since most contracts are performed rather than litigated, and since there are costs both to
researching the law and to raising the possibility of breach in the course of negotiations, parties
may not care what the law says. One especially striking illustration of these incentives is
supplied by Stuart Macaulay’s famous article, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) in which he reported that house counsel in the
paper business continued to employ a standard clause which they all knew had been held
unenforceable by Benjamin Cardozo and the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at 60.
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protect whatever modest reliance interests might be deemed “reasonable”
despite the fact that the relying party could have protected itself by negotiating
a contractual term but did not.
With substantive concerns thus bounded, technical issues become the
principal focus of judicial creativity in contract law. Judges must figure out
how best to devise a legal doctrine which is stable and predictable and which
can accommodate whatever intuitions they (and their colleagues and
successors) have about reasonable reliance interests and other “equities of the
case.” That challenge is what provoked the quest for a stable, unified common
law doctrine of Contracts. It has seemed natural to many judges and lawyers—
and it seems natural, I find, to most first-year law students—to suppose that the
contract law should consist mostly of formal rules that apply to all promises
without regard to their content or their maker. After all, we permit people to
make contracts about almost anything, and most of us believe that there is
some general duty to keep promises. Moreover, if (as I have suggested)
concerns about morality or economic policy are destined to have only modest
bite in contracts cases, then perhaps we can craft general rules without
worrying too much about the exceptional cases which the rule gets “wrong.”
The “wrong” will be relatively minor since parties will be able to protect
themselves by contracting around the rule; hence we can live with the “wrong”
in exchange for the benefit of a clear rule.
Yet, however plausible all this might sound in the abstract, contract law
has always been dogged by, and has often yielded to, arguments in favor of
special exceptions and fact-sensitive judgments. We may say that “a promise
is a promise,” but when confronted with particular cases, our reactions often
vary depending on who promised what to whom and under what
circumstances. And while broad, bright-line rules may be cheap and easy to
apply, they turn out to be fragile.6 If a blunt rule seems to produce unjust
results, judges will be tempted to abandon, limit, modify, or circumvent it.
6. Karl Llewellyn criticized contract professors for supposing that one could draw “safe
conclusions as to business cases of the more ordinary variety” on the basis of “what courts or
scholars rule about the idiosyncratic desires of one A to see one B climb a fifty-foot greased
flagpole or push a peanut across the Brooklyn Bridge.” Karl N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of
Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. 2), 48 YALE L. J. 779, 785-86 (1939). Llewellyn cautioned
against assuming that identical principles would apply in family settings and in business settings,
and he suggested that “[t]he influence of the facts relative to the influence of the normally
applicable rule increases roughly with the square of the peculiarity of the facts.” Id. After these
sensible observations, however, Llewellyn concluded that “if a peculiar case is decided in true
accordance with a rule in use in normal cases, that is excellent indication of the living power of
that normal rule; it has overcome even tough and troublesome facts.” Id. I am not so sure. The
unflinching application of a rule to facts it does not fit may eventually generate criticism of the
rule, criticism that might weaken even the core applications of the rule. If I were interested in the
longevity of a legal doctrine, I would want to confine it to that domain in which it seemed to
produce reasonable results.
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Over the course of the twentieth century contract law moved in two
particularistic directions, fragmenting into multiple domains defined by
subject-matter (such as sales or employment law) and embracing openly
substantive standards which invite judges to assess the equities of cases oneby-one (such as the doctrine of promissory estoppel or the Restatement
Second’s remarkably flexible provisions governing mistake and
impracticability).7
Contracts may be, as Gilmore suggested, dead. The quest for a grand
unified common law doctrine of contracts may be a failure. For pedagogical
purposes, it does not really matter: even if contracts is dead, there is good
reason to teach twentieth century contracts common law to first-year law
students in the twenty-first century. The story of American contract law’s
evolution is a wonderful vehicle for teaching students about judicial
techniques. That narrative is made richer and more compelling because
populated by judges and other law-makers who were brilliantly self-conscious
about questions of judicial technique: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin
Cardozo, Arthur Corbin, Jerome Frank, and Karl Llewellyn, among others.8
For sheer legal brilliance, my favorites among these are Llewellyn and
Corbin, but for teaching purposes my favorite is Cardozo, because he was so
acutely sensitive to the requirements of the judicial role and because he wanted
so much (too much, as I shall shortly explain) from contracts doctrine. Among
Cardozo’s opinions, my favorite is Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua
County Bank of Jamestown.9 Allegheny College is the focal point of my firstsemester syllabus. Cardozo’s opinion is puzzling and provocative in a way
that virtually compels students to wonder what the great common law judge
was up to. And—as I hope to convince you in a moment—once they ask that
question, the opinion pulls them in deeper and deeper, begetting ever more
sophisticated questions and hypotheses about the judicial role.
If you’ve read this far in an article about teaching contracts, you probably
know Allegheny College well—but I’ll provide a brief summary, just in case
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (promissory estoppel), §§ 151-58
(mistake) and §§ 261-81 (impossibility and frustration) (1979). Although her deconstructive
approach is not generally to my liking, Clare Dalton does a nice job pointing up the complete
indeterminacy of the Restatement provisions on mistake, impossibility, and frustration. Clare
Dalton, The Deconstruction of Contract, 94 YALE L. J. 997, 1063-65 (1985).
8. Here I want to throw a bouquet to the wonderful editing of FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT
GILMORE AND ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986).
The book has preserved both the rich wit and insight of minds like Cardozo, Corbin and
Llewellyn, supplemented them with the editors’ own distinctive perspectives, and provided
students with ample exposure to the challenging (sometimes quirky) cases and doctrines that
provoked those thinkers. The result is an intellectually challenging, and uniquely rewarding, set
of materials from which to teach contracts. There are rumblings from Aspen about a new edition;
I, for one, hope that any changes will be very modest indeed.
9. 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
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you’ve forsaken it in favor of more modern and “relevant” decisions, or in case
you are, perhaps, that elusive “generalist” reader whom law reviews always
aspire to reach! In 1921, Mary Yates Johnston had pledged to give $5000 to
Allegheny College. Johnston made her promise in a formal written instrument;
it provided, among other things, that her pledge would be fulfilled not later
than thirty days after her death, that it should be known as the “Mary Yates
Johnston Memorial Fund,” and that it should be used to “educate students
preparing for the Ministry.” Johnston made a $1000 payment to the College
during her lifetime (this fact, as we shall see, took on great importance in
Cardozo’s construction of the case), but changed her will prior to her death and
left nothing more to the College. The College sued her estate seeking the
balance of the pledge. The question was whether Johnston’s promise to the
College was unenforceable for want of consideration.
Cardozo labored mightily to demonstrate that there was consideration for
the promise. His analysis was intricate and difficult to grasp, but, as Professor
Alfred Konefsky has demonstrated,10 the skeleton of Cardozo’s reasoning can
be summarized relatively briefly. Cardozo endorsed a demanding formulation
of the bargain theory of consideration, pursuant to which “[t]he promise and
the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other.”11 In other
words, Johnston’s promise was enforceable only if she gave it in order to get
something that she wanted from the College, and only if the College would not
have given her what she wanted had she not made her promise. This
formulation of the consideration doctrine might seem devastating to the
College’s case, since charitable pledges are generally regarded as gifts, for
which donors demand nothing. But Cardozo went on to hold that the bargain
formula was not so hard to satisfy as it first seemed. In the past, he said,
various considerations, including “conceptions of public policy” had “more or
less subconsciously” led judges to soften the doctrine’s application.12 Some
precedents invoked or pointed to “the innovation of promissory estoppel.”13
According to Cardozo, the upshot of all these “irregularities of form”14 in the
consideration doctrine was that its elements might sometimes be deemed
satisfied by implication from normative concerns about moral duty or social
policy, rather than on the basis of more nakedly factual argument about what
the parties had done. Hence, in particular, the College might be able to show
10. Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, Or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the Allegheny
College Case, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 654 (1987). My summary here differs from Konefsky’s
only with regard to minor expositional points; I think that Konefsky’s doctrinal analysis is
correct.
11. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174 (quoting the opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes in
Wisc. & Mich. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903)).
12. Id. at 175.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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on the basis of “implications inherent in [the social practice of] subscription
and acceptance”15 that Johnston had gotten something in exchange for her
promise. And, indeed, Cardozo went on to imply both that Johnston had
demanded that the College should publicize her gift in order “to perpetuate her
name,” and next to imply that the College had promised to provide such
publicity when it accepted the $1000 which Johnston donated before her
death.16 The College’s implied promise, made in response to Johnston’s
implied demand, provided the consideration, which rendered her promise
enforceable. Cardozo gave no indication that these conclusions depended in
any way upon triable issues of fact about whether Mary Yates Johnston was
really interested in “perpetuat[ing] her name”; on the contrary, the implications
were apparently sustainable as a matter of law. In any event, Cardozo not only
reversed the trial and intermediate appellate court decisions dismissing the
College’s complaint, but entered judgment on the College’s behalf.
Cardozo bobbed and wove. He articulated a tough test—the bargain
theory of consideration, in full Holmesian rigor—but then held that its
elements might be satisfied by “implication.”17 He nodded in the direction of
the controversial doctrine of promissory estoppel, but then declared that the
case could be decided without “recourse to th[at] innovation.”18 At the end of
his article, Professor Konefsky identified, without endeavoring to answer, the
crucial question raised by Cardozo’s circuitous path: “What was Cardozo’s
larger purpose in this and similar enterprises?”19 Why, in other words, did
Cardozo offer so complicated an argument when he could easily have crafted
much simpler ones? A prominent school of thought supposes that Cardozo
was skillfully but somewhat deceptively manipulating doctrine to disguise a
creative effort to improve contract law. Grant Gilmore observed about
Cardozo that, although he was “a truly innovative judge[,]” he “was
accustomed to hide his light under a bushel. The more innovative the decision
to which he had persuaded his brethren on the court, the more his opinion
strained to prove that no novelty—not the slightest departure from prior law—
was involved.”20 Leon Lipson analogized Cardozo’s opinion in Allegheny
College to an optical illusion. According to Lipson, Cardozo’s “problem was
that on the consideration side he had a solid rule but shaky facts; on the

15. Id.
16. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175.
17. Id. at 176.
18. Id. at 175.
19. Konefsky, supra note 10, at 686 n.83. As Konefsky’s formulation of the question
suggests, Cardozo’s intricate style in Allegheny College was not unique to that case; it
characterized many of his other contracts and torts opinions. On the other hand, Cardozo could
sometimes be breathtakingly direct and to-the-point—as in, for example, Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
20. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 75 (1977).
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promissory-estoppel side he had a shaky rule but (potentially) solid facts.”
Lipson suggested that, in effect, Cardozo “twirled” the facts and the law “to
give the impression that he had solid facts fitting a solid rule.”21
Even if these descriptions were fully accurate (and I’m pretty sure that they
are not), Cardozo’s opinion would be a wonderful vehicle for inspiring
students to ponder what it means to “think like a judge.” First of all, if
Cardozo’s goal in Allegheny College was to manipulate doctrine in order to
bring about an innovation, why not forthrightly announce a new rule? What
did he hope to gain from so much complexity and subtlety? Was he just
hoping to confuse lawyers? If so, were lawyers actually duped by Cardozo?
Or could they see what he was up to? These questions are made all the more
compelling by the fact that Cardozo is revered by many lawyers as the greatest
American common law judge of the twentieth century. In the classroom at
NYU, I point out the window, and remind my students that there’s a rather
good law school up the street named after this fellow.22 If Allegheny College is
a self-conscious act of deception, why do lawyers hold Cardozo in such
esteem? Is deceit what we want from judges? If so, what would that tell us
about the judicial role and the nature of judicial creativity? If not, is there
some better way to understand why Cardozo chose the strategy he did?
Moreover, if we view Allegheny College as an outcome-oriented effort to
manipulate legal doctrine, it turns out to be remarkably hard—and theoretically
intriguing—to specify the “outcome” that drove Cardozo’s reasoning. One
possibility is that he was trying to do justice in the individual case before him.
That’s possible, but I have doubts. I said earlier that the equities rarely strike
me as especially compelling in contracts cases, and Allegheny College is no
exception to the rule. Cardozo recited no evidence whatsoever to suggest that
the College suffered special harm when Johnston defaulted on her pledge. As
far as we know, for example, the College had not relied on Johnston’s gift to
hire new faculty, start new programs, begin new construction projects, or
anything else. From what the opinion tells us, the College was simply out the
gift, which made the College no different from any other disappointed donee.
If the College was not specially harmed, was Mary Johnston guilty of some
moral delict? Perhaps Cardozo thought so. He certainly invited a negative
judgment upon her behavior. He embraced, for example, an earlier court’s
assertion that revocations of charitable pledges amount to “breaches of faith

21. Leon Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, 23 YALE L. REP. 8, 11 (1977). Lipson’s
witty and elegant observations are excerpted in KESSLER, GILMORE & KRONMAN, supra note 8,
at 509-10.
22. Richard Posner has engaged in a highly statistical “citation analysis” in order to conclude
that Cardozo in fact enjoys a high reputation. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN
REPUTATION 74-91 (1990). Isn’t a single law school named after Cardozo better evidence of high
reputation than a boatload of citations?
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toward the public.”23 Yet, not every revocation of a promise to a charity
deserves moral censure. Cardozo, if he knew anything about the circumstances
that led Mary Johnston to change her mind, said nothing. As it happens, she
might have had good cause. Richard Danzig, in unpublished research reported
by Alfred Konefsky,24 unearthed evidence that puts Johnston in a favorable
light. Danzig interviewed Johnston’s acquaintances, and they told him that
Johnston had withdrawn the pledge because she feared she could not otherwise
provide properly for her impoverished cousins. Moreover, Johnston may have
believed that her $1000 payment to the College, far from being a downpayment on her legacy (which is the way Cardozo construed it), was instead
negotiated with College representatives as a release payment: Johnston thought
that the College had accepted $1000 immediately in lieu of the right to receive
$5000 after her death.25
Let’s try another hypothesis. Perhaps Cardozo was not driven by the
desire to produce an equitable outcome in Allegheny College itself, but rather
by a more forward-looking objective: perhaps he wanted to create a better rule
to govern later cases involving charitable pledges. If so, then Cardozo’s plan
of attack immediately provokes interesting questions for anybody interested in
judicial techniques. If one wishes to affect the disposition of cases about
charitable pledges, then an obvious strategy would be to articulate a rule
tailored specifically to that subject. That was apparently the approach of prior
New York case law; Cardozo noted that the consideration doctrine had not
been strictly applied in cases involving promises to aid a charity.26 It is also
the approach adopted by the Restatement Second, which declares charitable
subscriptions enforceable even in the absence of reliance.27 But Cardozo
framed Allegheny College in terms of very general questions about the nature
of consideration, rather than questions about exceptions to, or exceptional subcategories within, the broader doctrine.
What’s more, Cardozo’s holding in Allegheny College seems poorly
calculated to provide charities with enforceable rights. His reasoning
emphasized, first, that Mary Johnston had stipulated that her gift “should be
‘known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund’”28 (from which fact
Cardozo inferred that she wanted the College to publicize her name) and,
second, that the College had already accepted a portion of the gift (from which
fact Cardozo inferred that the College had taken on a duty to publicize the
gift). The first of these facts might be relatively common—many (though

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175 (quoting Barnes v. Perine, 12 N.Y. 18, 24 (1854)).
Konefsky, supra note 10, at 657.
Id.
Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174-75.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175.
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certainly not all) donors want a particular name (often their own, or a
relative’s) attached to their gifts. But the second fact—that the College had
already received part of the gift—seems an accident. If it is taken seriously as
a prerequisite to recovery, then Allegheny College would benefit charities in a
relatively narrow, and arbitrarily selected, range of cases. Of course, one
might suppose that Cardozo’s emphasis on the down payment was mere
window-dressing; confronted with different facts in the future, he would have
modified the doctrine in some clever way, and the charity would have won
again. Yet, not every charity was guaranteed that Cardozo himself would
decide its case—and, what’s more, some careful readers of Cardozo (including
his biographer, Andrew Kaufman) believe that he genuinely wanted to limit
the circumstances in which charitable bequests would be enforceable.29
Finally, if Cardozo’s goal was to produce a rule that would help charities,
then his project compels us to think about the complex ways in which legal
rules create incentives for private behavior. Let’s assume that government
should encourage people to give to charities. There are various ways for the
law to do that—such as, for example, by making charitable contributions taxdeductible. But there are at least two reasons to doubt how much charities
would benefit from a rule that allows them to sue when donors get cold feet.30
First, to the extent that donors know about the rule, it may discourage them
from promising gifts in the first place: people may be less willing to make
pledges to charities if they believe that by doing so they expose themselves (or
their heirs) to the possibility of a lawsuit.31 Second, most charities depend
upon the future good will of potential donors. One wonders how many college
fund-raising offices would follow the model of Allegheny College and sue
donors who withdraw gifts. Would alums be eager to pledge money to a
college that sues its benefactors?32 A charity that litigates against its donors
risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg.33
29. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 334 (1998) (“[T]he fact that [Cardozo] strived so hard
to find consideration . . . suggests that he was still not ready to enforce a pure pledge.”).
Kaufman also suggests that Cardozo wanted to send “a message to charities about the necessity of
honoring their obligations to donors.” Id. at 335.
30. Not all courts have been persuaded that there are compelling reasons of social policy to
enforce charitable requests in the absence of substantial reliance by the charity on the promise.
See, e.g., Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1989) (in the
absence of reliance, “there is no injustice in declining to enforce the decedent’s promise”); the
general issue is discussed in the excellent treatise of E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 97-98
& n. 38 (3d ed. 1999).
31. The brief for the Johnston estate in Allegheny College—a brief signed by, among others,
future Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson—emphasized that the College’s pledge form did
not announce itself to be a “‘contract’ or ‘promissory note.’ Many a cautious widow would shy at
that!” Konefsky, supra note 10, at 698-99.
32. Imagine, for example, that (as Danzig’s research suggested, see supra, note 24 and
accompanying text) Mary Johnston withdrew her bequest because she wanted to care for an
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Is there any other way to conceive of Cardozo’s objective in Allegheny
College? Perhaps his goal was more abstract: perhaps he meant to improve the
law of consideration in general, rather than to fashion a better rule regarding
the enforceability of charitable bequests. Perhaps, for example, Cardozo
intended to legitimate some version of promissory estoppel.34 His opinion
probably had that effect.35 Cardozo adverted to the doctrine of promissory
estoppel in order to justify his conclusion that elements of the consideration
doctrine might be deemed satisfied by “implication”; he treated those decisions
with approval, and thereby endowed the doctrine with a patina derived from
the reputations of both Cardozo himself and the New York Court of Appeals,
the nation’s most distinguished common law court. But if Cardozo’s desired
“outcome” in Allegheny College was to buttress the doctrine of “promissory
estoppel,” then the case is odd in two ways. First, Allegheny College is a
bizarre vehicle for Cardozo’s purpose. Professor Lipson was way off the mark
when he said that with promissory estoppel Cardozo had “a shaky rule but
(potentially) solid facts.”36 Much more the reverse is true. The rule wasn’t so
shaky. According to Cardozo himself, New York had already “adopted the
doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in
connection with our law of charitable subscriptions.”37 The problem with the
promissory estoppel doctrine, as with the consideration doctrine, was that the
facts were bad for the College. In the old New York cases on charitable
subscriptions and promissory estoppel, there was clear evidence of reliance. In
Barnes v. Perine,38 for example, a religious society had demolished its old
impoverished relative. The College would risk a rather unflattering newspaper story—Konefsky
suggests the headline, “Grasping College Decimates Old Woman’s Estate”—that would
embarrass its fund-raising efforts in general. Konefsky, supra note 10, at 683.
33. Mary Frances Budig, Gordon T. Butler and Lynne M. Murphy, who believe that charities
should pursue more aggressive litigation policies against donors who try to back out of pledges,
nevertheless observe that in practice, “[w]hen it comes to enforcing pledges, charities have
demonstrated a timidity not characteristic of their solicitation practices.” BUDIG, BUTLER &
MURPHY, Pledges to Non-Profit Organizations: Are They Enforceable and Must They Be
Enforced?, 2 TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY 3 (1993). According to the authors, “[c]harities seem to
fear the loss of subscribers if it became the practice to sue to enforce the subscriptions.” Still, to
say that charities have been “timid” about bringing suit does not mean that they have never or
rarely done so, and Budig et. al. compile an impressive list of cases in which charities have
brought suit. The list is powerful evidence that rights of the sort created by Cardozo in Allegheny
College have been deemed valuable by some charities—and, presumably, the threat of suit may
be valuable even under circumstances where, if push came to shove, the charity would retreat
rather than sue.
34. For a forceful presentation of this view, see generally Mike Townsend, Cardozo’s
Allegheny College Opinion: A Case Study in Law as Art, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1103 (1996).
35. Id. at 1144.
36. KESSLER, GILMORE & KRONMAN, supra note 8, at 510.
37. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175.
38. 12 N.Y. 18 (1854).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1524

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1511

church in reliance upon pledges of money to build a replacement. One can
understand why judges in that case would be sympathetic to the charity’s
plight! As we have already noticed, Cardozo presented no evidence of
detrimental reliance by Allegheny College. Run the facts of Allegheny College
through today’s leading formulation of promissory estoppel—section 90(1) of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts—and the College almost certainly
loses.39
If your goal is to highlight the need to reform the law so that reasonable
reliance will render a promise enforceable, then Allegheny College is a lousy
case to use: there’s no reliance, and if there were reliance, there would be no
need for reform, since existing precedents would suffice. If the “outcome”
Cardozo was after was the legitimation of “promissory estoppel” or reliancebased theories of recovery in general, then why not do it in a case like Siegel v.
Spear,40 where detrimental reliance really was the core of the plaintiff’s claim
and where the plaintiff could not invoke that theory absent significant reform
to the law?41 Perhaps Cardozo was worried that Allegheny College was the
best chance he would get. During Cardozo’s tenure, the New York Court of
Appeals assigned cases through a rotation system.42 Hence Cardozo could not
claim the assignment in Siegel (although he could presumably have concurred
separately, as he did in some other cases), and, if another case involving
detrimental reliance came along, there was no guarantee that Cardozo would
get the opinion. So even if Allegheny College wasn’t a perfect case for the job,
it was at least Cardozo’s case, and that was nothing to sneeze at.

39. As has already been mentioned, the Restatement (Second) contains an entirely separate
provision, § 90(2), to render charitable subscriptions enforceable on facts like those of Allegheny
College.
40. 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923).
41. Siegel is the first case I assign each year; it is wonderfully terse and rich. I use it to teach
students how to read a judicial opinion, and I often spend two full weeks poring over its
intricacies. In brief, Siegel had stored his furniture with the Spear company; he forebore from
purchasing insurance in reliance upon a promise by Spear’s agent, McGrath, to get the insurance
for him. The Court of Appeals held that there was consideration for the promise. The opinion is
murky, but one thing that court said clearly was that, on its chosen rationale (whatever that was!),
there was no need to “determine whether the plaintiff, in refraining from insuring through his own
agent at the suggestion of McGrath surrendered any right which would furnish a consideration for
McGrath’s promise.” Id. at 416. The court’s refusal to adopt a reliance-based theory becomes
especially provocative if one compares it to the rationale adopted by the intermediate appellate
court, which explicitly vetted the issue of promissory estoppel: the majority ruled for Siegel on
the ground that “plaintiff’s abandonment of his purpose to insure, in reliance on the defendant’s
promise, was a sufficient consideration for the defendant’s promise,” Siegel v. Spear & Co., 195
A.D. 845, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1921), and the dissent objected that this amounted to “an
application of what is spoken of in the text books as a promissory estoppel.” Id. at 848 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
42. Townsend, supra note 34 at 1134; KAUFMAN, supra note 29, at 132.
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But if Cardozo’s desired “outcome” was to legitimate promissory estoppel,
there’s another oddity about Allegheny College. The opinion’s judgment about
promissory estoppel is highly ambiguous. At a minimum, it is quite certain
that, as Konefsky says, Cardozo after “having twice raised the issue of
promissory estoppel, dismissed it as a ground of decision.”43 It is certainly
arguable that, as Gilmore wrote, “Cardozo’s opinion . . . was essentially a
demonstration that the broad New York consideration theory made promissory
estoppel an unnecessary and undesirable refinement.”44 In any event,
Cardozo’s opinion left it unclear whether or not promissory estoppel was good
law in the state of New York.45
Gilmore’s characterization of Allegheny College suggests another, still
more abstract “outcome” which might have motivated Cardozo. Perhaps his
objective was to produce a kind of judicial “restatement” of the law of
consideration. We are now getting closer to the truth about Allegheny College.
Yet, to say that Cardozo wanted to produce a “restatement” of consideration
only pushes the question back a level: why would anybody want to do that?
“Well, to clarify the law and guide future decisions,” one might say. A fair
enough answer for a different judge and a different opinion—but not for
Cardozo and Allegheny College! Gilmore wrote that although “Cardozo
succeeded to an extraordinary degree in freeing up . . . the law of New
York . . . he went about doing this in such an elliptical, convoluted, at times
incomprehensible, fashion that the less gifted lower court New York judges
were frequently at a loss to understand what they were being told.”46 No
opinion illustrates Gilmore’s statement better than does Allegheny College.
The idea that Cardozo wanted to produce a “restatement” of the law is
made even more mysterious by the fact that its topic was the arcane
consideration doctrine. This isn’t, after all, products liability and MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.47 It is possible, I suppose, to believe that there are major
social policy stakes involved in the fine points of legal doctrine governing the
enforceability of gratuitous promises—but that seems implausible, and all the
more so when one notices that the landmark cases involve such matters as an
uncle’s promise to reward his nephew for steering clear of billiard halls,48 or an

43. Konefsky, supra note 10, at 649.
44. Id.
45. The most thorough review of the New York cases is William E. Nelson, A Man’s Word
and Making Money: Contract Law in New York, 1920-60, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1998).
The state of the law is sufficiently confusing that contracts casebooks have taken inconsistent
positions about whether New York courts have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Townsend, supra note 34, at 1146 & n. 276.
46. Gilmore, supra note 20, at 75.
47. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). A classic treatment of MacPherson and its impact is
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 20-25 (1949).
48. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
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Italian count’s effort to collect a marriage gift from his American father-inlaw.49 Of course, Cardozo was not the only person agitated by the issue—at
the time, the country’s finest legal minds had passionate opinions one way or
the other about consideration and promissory estoppel.50 But that historical
fact only deepens the mystery. What was everybody so excited about?
The answer to that question will lead us toward what is, in my judgment,
Cardozo’s real objective and away from the mistaken idea that Cardozo’s
reasoning was designed to deceive or trick his readers. But, insofar as we are
interested in the capacity of Allegheny College to teach students about how to
“think like a judge,” we should notice how far we have already come. We
have been pursuing the common opinion that Cardozo manipulated doctrine in
Allegheny College to achieve an outcome he desired. To make sense of that
hypothesis, we have had to identify a series of increasingly abstract and subtle
“outcomes” which Cardozo might have pursued. Goals like “legitimating
promissory estoppel” or “restating contract law” will come as surprising
discoveries to many students: they have never imagined goals of this kind,
much less that such goals might provide the moving force behind judicial
decisions. Even if Allegheny College were an outcome-oriented manipulation
of doctrine, it would have a lot to teach—by the nature both of its
“manipulation” and its “outcomes”—about judicial creativity and what it
means to “think like a judge.”
We have pending, though, an important question: why were so many
lawyers, Cardozo included, so excited about consideration and promissory
estoppel? As I’ve already indicated, I do not think that the social policy stakes
were anywhere close to high enough to explain the intense controversy over
these issues. The stakes were more distinctively jurisprudential: to take a
position about promissory estoppel, one had to take a position on the more
general question of whether and how it might be possible to offer a genuinely
“legal,” as opposed to essentially legislative or simply political, resolution to a
contested question of law. This meant, among other things, developing a
theory about what “precedent” was, and about whether it should (or even
could) control judicial decision-making.
These are, of course, among the perennial questions of Anglo-American
legal philosophy, and they were being pressed vigorously around the time of
Allegheny College by the American legal realists.51 Because the challenges
posed by legal realism were so general, there is obviously no reason why they
49. De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917). De Cicco is, of course, another one
of Cardozo’s opinions, and it has delights to match those of Allegheny College. See generally
Joshua P. Davis, Cardozo’s Judicial Craft and What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
777 (1993).
50. Townsend, supra note 34, at 1132-33.
51. Cardozo vigorously repudiated legal realism. John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1451-52 (1993).
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had to be fought out in the arena of consideration doctrine—and, of course,
that was not the only place where realists and their critics joined issue. So why
would consideration doctrine occasion such intense argument? Sheer historical
coincidence no doubt plays a part in the answer, but one can identify some of
the fuel for the fire. First, Langdell and Holmes had taken firm positions about
the content of the “scientific” or “rigorous” consideration doctrine.52
Intentionally or not, they thereby drew a line in the sand. Second, as Mike
Townsend has recently observed, at the time of Allegheny College Cardozo
and the American legal community were immersed in controversy over the
American Law Institute’s Restatement project.53 That project forced people to
decide how (if at all) it was possible to bring order to the divergent common
law precedents emerging from American state courts54 and, more specifically,
how to describe the consideration doctrine. Third, in the United States
Supreme Court, the distinction between law and (other forms of) politics was
being contested via cases about “the liberty of contract.” Now, obviously,
there is no doctrinal connection between the meaning of the Due Process
Clause on the one hand and the consideration doctrine on the other. The issues
are joined, however, not only nominally (as questions about contractual rights)
but at the level of political theory: to the extent that some lawyers and judges
regarded contractual rights as somehow “natural,” “pre-political,” or
determinable through “legal science” (and hence apolitical), that view could
have implications both for the meaning of contractual liberty and for the
Fourth, in one important respect the
content of contract doctrine.55
consideration doctrine was vastly different from the constitutional debates
about “liberty of contract” and the Due Process Clause: the policy stakes in the
consideration debate were, as I have already noted, probably quite small.
Absent any clear moral or economic reason to prefer one view of the
consideration doctrine over another, arguments about stare decisis and the
nature of legal reasoning (which might in other circumstances yield in the face
of blunt policy concerns) proved decisive. The consideration doctrine
therefore involved an odd fusion of the intensely practical (judges and the
American Law Institute had to take a stand one way or another on the
question) and the purely jurisprudential (abstract convictions about judicial

52. Holmes had said, “It would cut up the doctrine of consideration by the roots if a
promisee could make a gratuitous promise binding by subsequently acting in reliance on it.”
Commonwealth v. Scituate Savings Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1883). On Langdell, Holmes, and
consideration in general, see GILMORE, supra note 1, at 12-22.
53. Townsend, supra note 34, at 1118-21.
54. John C.P. Goldberg, Community and the Common Law Judge, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324,
1329 (1990) (discussing Cardozo’s hope that the American Law Institute could bring order to the
growing diversity of American precedents); see also Townsend, supra note 34, at 1119 (same).
55. Some of these connections are explored in MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1936 33-39 (1992).
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technique may actually have played a decisive role in determining most
people’s positions).
In any event, I think that Cardozo’s complex analysis in Allegheny College
can best be understood if we regard it as driven by, and as endeavoring to
elaborate, a particular theory about what judges should do when confronted
with inconsistent and apparently irreconcilable precedents. The theory is this:
the judge should endeavor to be faithful to everything and to produce some sort
of dialectical synthesis of competing positions. If this synthesis were done
right, it would both be guided by policy judgments and also be a guide to
social policy. Cardozo seemed to imagine, in quasi-Aristotelian fashion,56 that
competing legal precedents, doctrines, and theories all contained some part of
the truth, and that the task of the common law judge was to distill the truth out
of these positions by synthesizing them in a way that recognized and preserved
what was valuable in each of them.57
That, I think, is what Cardozo was getting at in a pair of elegant paragraphs
discussing the relationship between “half truths” and “whole truths” in legal
doctrine. Cardozo began with what he called a “classic form of statement”58
about consideration from the old case of Hamer v. Sidway.59 Yet immediately
he did an about-face: according to Cardozo, Hamer’s “classic . . . statement”
was “little more than a half truth” which required “many a supplementary
gloss” in order to arrive at the “classic doctrine.”60 Cardozo next quoted the
classic doctrine according to Holmes, Langdell, and Williston: “The promise
and the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other, in
whole or at least in part. It is not enough that the promise induces the
detriment or that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is
wanting.”61 But, Cardozo continued, “[t]he half truths of one generation tend
at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truths of another.”62
The consideration doctrine was no exception; indeed, said Cardozo, Holmes
had noted in 1881 that some courts had departed from the “classic doctrine” of
consideration, and Cardozo added that this “tendency toward effacement had

56. “[A]ll men lay hold on justice of some sort, but they only advance to a certain point, and
do not express the principle of absolute justice in its entirety.” ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 211 (H.
Rackham trans. 1977).
57. In a discussion of Cardozo’s more overtly jurisprudential writing, John C. P. Goldberg
described Cardozo as a “philosophical magpie” who gathered together “assemblages of
quotations from a diverse group of legal scholars and philosophers.” Goldberg, supra note 54, at
1324.
58. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174.
59. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
60. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174.
61. Id. (quoting a Supreme Court opinion by Holmes, and citing to both Williston and
Langdell).
62. Id.
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not lessened with the years.”63 Cardozo then launched his famous (famous
among contracts teachers, at least!) discussion of promissory estoppel, and
concluded by saying:
[d]ecisions which have stood for so long and which are supported by so many
considerations of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to save the
symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so much from any
reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of practice and
procedure.64

“The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in
the law as the whole truths of another”—so what is the “whole truth” about
consideration and which are the “half truths”? There are at least two ways to
answer that question. The most obvious is to construe Cardozo to say that
Holmes, Langdell, and Williston had articulated the “whole truth” about
consideration. That interpretation would appeal to lawyers schooled in the
“classic doctrine.” Viewed this way, Cardozo’s opinion sets up a contrast
between messy precedent and pristine theory (the “whole truth”), and comes
down on the side of respecting precedent, even at the expense of theoretical
“whole truth.” But there is another, quite different, and in my view more
compelling, way to interpret Cardozo’s chain of argument. What “whole
truth” are we looking for? The “whole truth” about consideration. And since
consideration is a legal doctrine, it seems implausible that any theory can give
us the “whole truth” if it fails to account for significant lines of precedent. On
this reading, the classical Holmesian theory is not the “whole truth”—it’s just
another “half truth.” The “whole truth” is what Cardozo himself produces: an
account of consideration which tries to synthesize and preserve some part of
everything—Hamer v. Sidway, the “classic [but only half true] doctrine” of
Holmes and Langdell and Williston, and the welter of common law precedents
that were inconsistent with the “classic doctrine.” How was it possible to
incorporate the “classic doctrine” and inconsistent cases into a single theory?
By retaining the form of the Holmesian half truth but allowing its elements to
be proven through “implication.” That is why Cardozo struggled to come up
with a line of reasoning which turned out to be so complicated that it befuddled
and perplexed several generations of students, lawyers, judges, and contracts
professors!
Cardozo’s effort was Herculean, not just in the general sense that it
involved almost super-human feats of legal strength, but because Cardozo
exemplified a judicial method which Ronald Dworkin later described by
reference to a hypothetical judge named Hercules.65 Like Dworkin,66 Cardozo
63. Id.
64. Id. at 175.
65. RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977); RONALD M. DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 239 (1986).
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sought a middle ground between the formalist ideal of a legal science and the
realist prescription that hard cases should be decided on the basis of social
policy.67 Like Dworkin,68 Cardozo found that middle ground in an effort
simultaneously to “fit” and “justify” legal precedent. And like Dworkin,69
Cardozo viewed the relevant domain of legal precedent very broadly—so that,
for example, in Allegheny College Cardozo’s ruminations encompassed all of
consideration doctrine, not just the cases most directly concerned with
charitable subscriptions. It is fitting that Dworkin used a Cardozo opinion to
illustrate the jurisprudential protocol he favored.70 But if perhaps Cardozo
helped inspire Dworkin, it bears notice that Dworkin’s theory improves upon
Cardozo’s practice in at least one important respect. Cardozo asked too much
on the dimension of “fit.” He tried to reconcile the irreconcilable. In
Allegheny College, Cardozo attempted to preserve both the Holmesian bargain
theory and cases inconsistent with that theory. In the end, his effort strikes me
as unpersuasive, and I have the impression that most readers (and certainly
most students) find it altogether baffling. Perhaps because Cardozo wanted so
much from fit, his references to “justification” were understated.71 Dworkin,
by contrast, makes clear that his Hercules must sometimes reject precedents as
“mistakes,” and, more fundamentally, that Hercules will have to choose among
multiple plausible interpretations of the law on the basis of normative
judgments about social justice.72
There is thus a sense in which Gilmore was right when he suggested that
Cardozo “was accustomed to hide his light under a bushel.” If Gilmore meant
only to describe the effect of Cardozo’s method, he was right—Cardozo’s
66. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 65, at 228.
67. Professor Goldberg is one of the few scholars who treats Cardozo’s legal reasoning as
sincere, rather than as an outcome-oriented rhetorical exercise; Goldberg persuasively
characterizes Cardozo as “both an anti-formalist and an anti-realist.” Goldberg, supra note 54, at
1455.
68. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 65, at 239.
69. Id. at 245.
70. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 65, at 118-19 (discussing
MacPherson).
71. Cardozo himself may not have understood how much his opinions depended upon
contestable judgments of value and policy. In an important new book about the New York courts,
the legal historian William E. Nelson argues that “[a]lthough we now believe that Cardozo’s
[methodology] leaves judges with a vast ‘power of innovation’ amounting to lawmaking freedom,
Cardozo did not: in his view, ‘the bulk and pressure of the rules that hedge’ judges ‘on every
side’ made their freedom ‘[i]nsignificant.’” NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW,
POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-80 (forthcoming, U. N. Carol. Press 2001)
[manuscript at 37-38; copy on file with the author] (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW 61-63, 65, 78-79 (1924) and BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 136-37 (1921)).
72. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 65, at 247 (on “mistakes”) and at 255
(hard cases will require judges to choose among interpretations on the basis of normative values).
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quest to reconcile opposites had the consequence of concealing (not only from
readers, but probably from Cardozo himself) the judgments of policy and
principle, which were in fact decisive to Cardozo’s reasoning. But if Gilmore
meant to describe the intent behind Cardozo’s machinations, then I think
Gilmore was wrong. Cardozo was not using doctrine to disguise innovations
or to set up a smoke screen. As John C. P. Goldberg has rightly observed,
Cardozo’s opinions are “consumed by discussions of . . . concepts like . . .
‘consideration’ . . . not because he thought such talk would seduce lawyers . . .
[but] because he believed that law contains meaningful concepts [which] do
and should guide judicial decisions.”73 The obscurities of Cardozo’s reasoning
were the result of a sincere commitment to the impossible goal of fitting
everything (or almost everything) in legal precedent, of finding and then
preserving value even in theories and doctrinal formulae which Cardozo
deemed unsatisfactory.74 The fact that this aspiration was doomed to failure
does not render it any less interesting or noble. If students can be made to
understand why a judge might have such an ambition, and why even a judge so
brilliant as Cardozo could not succeed at it, they will have learned a great deal
about what it means to “think like a judge,” and so about how to “think like a
lawyer.”
The challenge is to convey to students the subtleties of Cardozo’s project.
I spend three full class periods on Allegheny College. In the first class, we
unpack the doctrine of Allegheny College. In the second class, we focus upon
why Cardozo thought it necessary to treat the issue in such complex fashion.
For the third class, I assign Dworkin’s article “How Law is Like Literature.”75
I use Dworkin’s argument to provide the students with a theoretical model
through which to comprehend Cardozo, and I use Cardozo to introduce
students to the questions and insights that animate Dworkin’s theory. The
three classes are the capstone to a seven-week unit on promissory estoppel and
consideration, all of which is designed to set up Allegheny College. During the
six weeks in the syllabus prior to the Allegheny College assignments, students
learn competing theories about the enforceability of promises; they read

73. Goldberg, supra note 54, at 1452.
74. Professor Goldberg is apparently more optimistic about the success of Cardozo’s project
than am I; he suggests that “[p]resent-day scholars interested in developing an adequate antiRealist theory of law . . . could hardly do better than to undertake a careful examination of
[Cardozo’s] work.” Id. at 1476. Goldberg’s judgment is based on a review of Cardozo’s
jurisprudential corpus as a whole, with special emphasis on Cardozo’s tort law opinions, whereas
my argument in this article is derived entirely from Allegheny College. It is possible that
Allegheny College is unrepresentative of Cardozo’s more general jurisprudential convictions—
although I’m not inclined to think so.
75. RONALD M. DWORKIN, How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146-66
(1985). I believe this essay to be Dworkin’s best short statement of his general approach,
although I much prefer the title under which it was originally published, “Law as Interpretation.”
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several of the precedents eventually discussed by Cardozo in Allegheny
College; they become acquainted with figures like Holmes and Cardozo; and
they get an introduction to ideas like the notion of “legal formalism.” Most of
all, I try to prod the students to develop a sense of mystery, wonder and
curiosity about why judges were so agitated about the possibility that
reasonable reliance might render a promise binding in the absence of
bargained-for consideration.
Even with all this time, planning and attention, Allegheny College remains
a tough nut to crack. The jurisprudential context of Allegheny College is
conceptually demanding. I find, though, that my students at NYU (admittedly,
NYU gets exceptionally good students) rise to the challenge. They take pride
in their capacity to comprehend ideas and materials which they rightly perceive
as difficult. They find satisfaction in the discussion of topics that engage their
curiosity and their imagination.
They come away with a deepened
understanding of what is at stake in legal argument, and many of them come
away more excited about their legal education.
It would undoubtedly be possible to achieve these goals outside contracts
and without the help of Benjamin Cardozo. Somebody might even suppose
that Cardozo is a hindrance. Wouldn’t it be better to use more recent
exemplars to show students what it means to “think like a judge”? After all,
Cardozo’s exquisite anxiety about fidelity to legal precedent is not only unique
but arguably anachronistic. One might think that today’s judges, if they shared
Cardozo’s sensitivity to questions of justice and social policy, would be more
explicit about the relevance of such concerns. That view, however, strikes me
as mistaken in two respects, one sociological and the other pedagogical. As a
sociological matter, I think that judges today are as worried and confused as
they were in Cardozo’s day about such things as the notion that “judges should
apply the law, not make it.” Hence the need for, and controversial reception
of, Dworkin’s work. As a pedagogical matter, I think it is a mistake to
exaggerate the importance of “contemporary relevance” as a criterion for
selecting assigned readings. Readings ought to bring to the classroom
something that would not otherwise be present. “Contemporary relevance” is
not lacking. My students and I inevitably come to the classroom equipped
with contemporary ideological prejudices. Many students believe themselves
to be concerned about nothing other than “contemporary relevance,” and of
course faculty can count on them to read outlines and study guides even if we
do not assign them—even, in fact, if we actively discourage students from
such reading. In the classroom, what I want from a judicial opinion is the
manifestation of another mind, preferably both provocative and deep, though
not so different from the students as to be inaccessible. Cardozo’s opinions
supply that admirably well, and “contemporary relevance” emerges (or at least
I hope it does) from the process whereby my students and I collaborate to
interrogate his writing.
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My own judgment is that Contracts, where issues of judicial technique
figure so prominently, and Cardozo, who was so smart and so sophisticated
about such questions, provide nearly ideal vehicles for introducing students to
the nature of judicial and legal creativity. Perhaps that is one reason why
contracts has proven to be such a durable element in the first-year curriculum.
It is, in any event, the key to what I consider the most important objective in
my own version of the course.
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